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Comments
A Critique and Proposed Solution to the Adverse
Examination Problem Raised by Battered
Woman Syndrome Testimony in
State v. Hennum
JoAnn Hennum shot her husband as he slept on November
28, 1976.1 At her murder trial, she claimed that she suffered
from battered woman syndrome2 and acted in self-defense.3
JoAnn presented testimony on battered woman syndrome, in-
cluding testimony that she suffered from this syndrome. 4 The
prosecution, with trial court approval to conduct an adverse
mental examination of JoAnn, presented expert testimony that
JoAnn did not suffer from battered woman syndrome. The
jury rejected JoAnn's self-defense argument and convicted her
of second-degree felony murder.5 On appeal, the defense ar-
gued that the trial court deprived JoAnn of due process6 when
it compelled her to undergo the adverse mental examination.7
The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed, finding the adverse
1. State v. Hennum, 428 N.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
2. See infra note 15 and accompanying text (describing battered woman
syndrome). Dr. Lynn Powers, the defense expert, testified generally about
battered woman syndrome, and stated that JoAnn suffered from a severe case
of the syndrome. Hennum, 428 N.W.2d at 863. She further testified that
JoAnn was afraid on the night of the killing. State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d
793, 797 (Minn. 1989).
3. 441 N.W.2d at 797.
4. id.
5. Id.
6. Appellant's Brief at 33-37, State v. Hennum, 428 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (No. C5-87-1524). Specifically, the defense argued that, because
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02 did not authorize an adverse examination in the Hen-
num setting, no rule "establish[ed] procedure or machinery for conducting an
adverse examination.... There are no procedures or guidelines to guarantee
the right of the accused against self-incrimination." Id at 37.
7. Under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, an adverse mental
examination is an examination requested by the prosecution to rebut defense
expert testimony regarding the mental state of the defendant. MINN. R. CRM.
P. 20.02. A court-appointed expert conducts the examination. Id.; see also in-
fra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
The Hennum trial court reasoned that the prosecution could adequately
rebut Dr. Powers' testimony that JoAnn suffered from battered woman syn-
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examination violated JoAnn's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination, necessitating a new trial." The Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed that, absent an applicable rule of crimi-
nal procedure, the trial court had no inherent authority to or-
der the examination. 9 The supreme court affirmed the
conviction, however, holding that the compelled adverse exami-
nation did not violate JoAnn's fifth amendment rights10 and a
new trial was not necessary.n  The court also held that expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome is admissible to prove
self-defense, but that an expert may not testify that the defend-
ant actually suffers from battered woman syndrome.' 2 The
supreme court reasoned that such a rule eliminated the need
for an adverse psychological examination because if neither the
defense nor the prosecution presented direct testimony about
drome only by having another expert examine JoAnn. 441 N.W.2d at 797 (cit-
ing trial court). The trial court concluded:
[It is apparent... that the state of mind and subjective beliefs of the
defendant... is [sic] integral to her self-defense theory. Therefore, in
order to have a fair opportunity to rebut it, the State should be enti-
tled to have [a court-appointed] expert examine the defendant.
8. 428 N.W.2d at 871.
9. 441 N.W.2d at 799-800.
10. The supreme court concluded that the trial court's error was harm-
less, because
at the time of [the state expert's] examination, the defendant had al-
ready voluntarily submitted to an examination by her own expert, Dr.
Powers. During this examination the defendant relayed information
regarding the events of the night in question, and Dr. Powers subse-
quently testified to those facts.... As a result of these actions the de-
fendant waived any right to remain silent, and under these
circumstances [the state's expert] could testify.
Id at 800.
11. Id
12. Id. at 799 (emphasizing that the trier of fact must determine whether
the defendant suffers from battered woman syndrome).
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not, technically, need to address the
general issue of admissibility to reach its narrow holding on adverse examina-
tions, because neither the defense nor the prosecution appealed the trial
court's admission of the testimony. Because no Minnesota appellate court had
addressed the admissibility of battered woman syndrome expert testimony,
however, it was logical for the supreme court to address the issue in Hennum.
In approving admission of the testimony, the supreme court used language
suggesting that the court regarded its decision on this issue as controlling-
We agree expert testimony on this issue is admissible since it would
help to explain a phenomenon not within the understanding of an or-
dinary lay person ... [T]he theory underlying the battered woman
syndrome is beyond the experimental stage and has gained a substan-
tial enough scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility.
441 N.W.2d at 798-99.
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the defendant, neither side would need to examine the
defendant.' 3
State v. Hennum represents a crucial development in bat-
tered woman syndrome jurisprudence. The majority of courts
that have considered the admissibility of expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome have admitted the testimony.14 The
question of admissibility appears to be resolved in most states,
including Minnesota, and is therefore not the central focus of
this Comment. As Hennum illustrates, however, issues relat-
ing to how extensively the defense may use expert testimony,
and how the prosecution may rebut that testimony, remain in
flux. Hennum directly addresses two of those issues:
1) whether an expert may testify that a defendant suffers from
the syndrome, and 2) if the defendant's expert bases her opin-
ion that the defendant suffers from the syndrome on a psycho-
logical examination of the defendant, whether the prosecution
is then entitled to an adverse psychological examination of the
defendant by a court-appointed expert.
This Comment criticizes the Minnesota Supreme Court's
treatment of these two central issues. Part I describes battered
woman syndrome, its growing role in self-defense claims, and
the current legal arguments surrounding defendant-specific ex-
pert testimony and adverse psychological examinations. Part II
places Hennum in the context of battered woman syndrome
case law. Part III disagrees with the Minnesota Supreme
Court's conclusions in Hennum, and argues that Minnesota
courts should allow a defense expert to make a subjective con-
clusion whether the defendant suffers from battered woman
syndrome. The Comment further argues that direct expert tes-
timony, based on a psychological examination of the defendant,
justifies an adverse examination of the defendant by a court-ap-
pointed expert. The Comment concludes that the Minnesota
Supreme Court should not have limited expert testimony to a
general description of battered woman syndrome, and proposes
a revised rule of criminal procedure to accommodate adverse
examinations in the battered woman syndrome context.
13. I& The supreme court noted that, if the defense expert is prohibited
from testifying as to whether the defendant suffers from battered woman syn-
drome, the defendant will not be examined by her expert, so the prosecution
will not have to rely on the results of an adverse examination to rebut the ex-
pert testimony. I&
14. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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I. USING BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME TO
ESTABLISH SELF-DEFENSE: ADMISSIBILITY
AND LIMITATIONS
A. BA=rERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND SELF-DEFENSE
Battered woman syndrome is a set of psychological and be-
havioral reactions exhibited by victims of severe, long-term, do-
mestic abuse.' 5 Not all battered women suffer from battered
woman syndrome, 16 and some women may develop more severe
symptoms than others.17 Researchers of battered woman syn-
15. Thyfault, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, in REP-
RESENTING ... BATTERE WOMEN WHO Kn.u 30,30 (S. Johann & F. Osanka ed.
1989).
The definition of a "battered woman" is quite broad, including "any wo-
man who has been the victim of physical, sexual, and/or psychological abuse
by her partner." Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in DOMESTIc VIO-
LENCE ON TRIAL 39, 39 (D. Sonkin ed. 1987). Not all battered women, however,
develop battered woman syndrome. I&r at 40. Psychologists use the battered
woman syndrome to identify those battered women who suffer from the syn-
drome, to measure how extensively t.he violence has affected these women
psychologically, and to intervene at crucial stages of the violence. Id. at 45.
Early research by Lenore Walker, a pioneer in battered woman syndrome
studies, revealed that the battered woman commonly has low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, prescribed feminine sex-role stereotypes,
and severe stress reactions. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 31 (1979).
The battered woman believes commonly held myths about battering relation-
ships and that no one can help her resolve her problems but herself. She ac-
cepts responsibility for her batterer's actions and suffers from guilt, but denies
experiencing fear or anger. In addition, the battered woman typically manipu-
lates her environment enough to prevent further violence and uses sex to es-
tablish intimacy. Id&
16. Douglas, supra note 15, at 40. Douglas explains that, although not all
battered women suffer from the syndrome, those that do are unable to re-
spond effectively to the violence because they are psychologically trapped in
the violent relationship. r&
17. Battering relationships also may move through several cycles of vio-
lence, just as battered women experience different levels of battered woman
syndrome. Lenore Walker has identified a cycle of violence that repeats itself
over and over in the battering relationship. L. WALKER, THE BArERED WO-
MAN SYNDROME 95 (1984). A recurring battering cycle has three phases: ten-
sion building, the acute battering incident, and loving contrition. Id at 95. As
the relationship becomes more violent, the first phase - tension building -
becomes more common and the third phase - loving contrition - becomes
less common. Id at 101.
Another theory of domestic violence is that the entire relationship be-
tween the batterer and the battered woman moves through several stages as a
"familial 'disease"' develops. See People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 654, 481
N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (1984) (citing the expert testimony of Dr. Matilda Rice). The
Emick court noted that "[i]n stage one there is verbal abuse and possibly mi-
nor physical abuse. Stage two involves an escalation of physical abuse in de-
gree and quantity and stage three occurs when the abuse 'gets totally out of
1026 [Vol. 74:1023
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drome have identified several psychological effects of severe
abuse on battered women, including the development of a
"learned helplessness" that keeps women from leaving their
batterers, 8self destructive coping mechanisms,19 and reactive
symptoms similar to those of post-traumatic stress disorder.20
control."' I& In Emick, the expert testified that the defendant was in "'the
worst end of stage three"' of the battering relationship. Id.
18. L. WALKER, supra note 17, at 86-94. Walker's research indicates that
battered women learn, over time, that they will be beaten regardless of their
behavior. Id. at 86. This repeated and "noncontingent" beating gives battered
women a "negative, pessimistic [belief] about the efficacy of their actions and
the likelihood of obtaining future rewards." Id.
Walker tested the hypothesis that a battered woman's noncontingent at-
tempts to control her batterer's violence eventually would produce a learned
helplessness and depression as the "repeated batterings, like -electrical shocks,
diminish the woman's motivation-to respond." Id at 87. Subsequent research
based on interviews with battered women confirmed that women who re-
mained in battering relationships suffered increased levels of fear, anxiety,
and depression, consistent with the learned helplessness theory. Id. at 87-89.
Women who left battering relationships experienced an increase, followed by a
decrease, in these symptoms. An increase in anger, disgust, and hostility ac-
companied the decrease in feelings of fear, anxiety, and depression. Id. These
results support the learned helplessness hypothesis. Id
19. Id at 33. Douglas also notes:
For example, a battered woman may use alcohol or drugs as a means
of numbing the effect of the violence.... Additionally, it is not un-
common for a battered wom:.a to be given prescription medication by
her physician for the explicit purpose of coping with anxiety resulting
from abuse.... Another common reaction to coping with victimiza-
tion is the minimization of the violent experience itself and of the an-
ger felt in reaction to it.
Douglas, supra note 15, at 43.
Walker relates the self-destructive coping mechanisms to the learned
helplessness theory, because women develop these skills "at the expense of es-
cape skills." L. WALKER, supra note 17, at 33. Walker concludes that focusing
only on survival may result in misperception of other important information,
such as methods of escape. Id
Both Walker and Douglas note, however, that society often misinterprets
coping and survival skills of battered women as signs of passivity and weak-
ness, coupled with an unwillingness to leave the violent relationship. Walker
emphasizes that "[t]he issue of the woman's response to violent attacks by the
man who loves her has been further clouded by the mythology that she
behaves in a manner which is either extremely passive or mutually aggres-
sive." Id Douglas observes that "[t]hese responses are often misunderstood as
indicative of the battered woman's pathology or weak character, rather than as
attempts to cope with the abusive and controlling environment in which she
lives." Douglas, supra note 15, at 43.
20. Id at 40-41. Researchers identify the effects of violence on battered
women using the same diagnostic criteria used to diagnose post-traumatic
stress disorder: "a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symp-
toms of distress in almost anyone," reexperience of the trauma in the form of
nightmares and fear, numbness and reduced involvement in the outside world,
and an extreme level of anxiety manifesting itself in hyperalertness, exagger-
1990] 1027
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Although courts and experts often refer to battered woman
syndrome as a set of psychological symptoms,2' they also insist
that battered woman syndrome is not a mental disease or de-
fect. 2 Rather, battered woman syndrome is considered a sub-
category of post-traumatic stress disorder,2 3 and several experts
have equated the psychological effects of battering with the ef-
fects of imprisonment on kidnap victims" and prisoners of war.24
Victims of abuse undergo personality changes as a result of
their abuse,25 and may suffer from a distorted mental state
short of mental illness. 26
Although defendants formerly used battered woman syn-
drome primarily to show mental incapacity,27 defendants now
most commonly use the syndrome to support claims of self-de-
fense.28 To establish self-defense in Minnesota, a defendant
ated startle response, sleep disturbance, difficulty concentrating, and memory
impairment. Id
21. See, e.g., People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 132, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361
(Crim. Ct. 1985) (referring to the syndrome as "a description of identifiable
psychological characteristics exhibited by women who have experienced physi-
cal and emotional abuse in an intimate relationship over an extended period of
time").
22. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, -, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167,
177 (1989). In Aris, Dr. Lenore Walker, the leading expert in the field of bat-
tered woman syndrome, testified that the syndrome is not a mental illness and
is not listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, a
diagnostic classification system of psychological disorders. Id.
23. Id at -, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (describing the syndrome as a type of
post-traumatic stress disorder '%vhich happens to anyone exposed to the de-
gree and kind of trauma... that would be expected to cause psychological
problems"); State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 66, 716 P.2d 563, 566 (1986) (describ-
ing the syndrome as a type of post-traumatic stress disorder "with the particu-
lar stressor being wife abuse"); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 467, 693 P.2d
475, 479 (1985) (stating that the severity and long continuity of abuse creates a
"mental attitude" in victims that makes them "disturbed persons"); Common-
wealth v. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 62, 555 A.2d 772, 783 (1989) (recognizing the
syndrome as a post-traumatic stress disorder).
24. Hundley, 236 Kan. at 466, 693 P.2d at 478; Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 62 &
n.6, 555 A.2d at 783 & n.6.
25. People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 654, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (1984) (cit-
ing testimony of Dr. Matilda Rice, a certified psychoanalyst who examined the
defendant).
26. Hundley, 236 Kan. at 467, 693 P.2d at 479.
27. Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Them-
selves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, in WoMEN's SELF-DEFENSE
CASES 1, 5 (E. Bochnak ed. 1981).
28. REPRESENTNG ... BATTRED WomEN WHO Kiu. 47 (S. Johann & F.
Osanka ed. 1989). Battered women advocates discourage defendants from us-
ing mental deficiency defenses because those defenses suggest that battered
women are insane, irrational, or mentally ill when they kill, rather than dem-
onstrating that battered women act out of the fears and psychological re-
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must establish that she honestly and reasonably believed that
she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm,29
and that the force she used against the victim was necessary to
avoid that danger.30
In Minnesota, self-defense turns on the question of the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's beliefs.31 Defendants typically
use expert testimony to establish that, because they suffered
from battered woman syndrome, their fears of imminent dan-
ger, and their beliefs about the amount of force necessary to
counteract that danger, were reasonable.32
When the defendant kills her batterer in a typical self-de-
fense situation - as her batterer lunges at her or physically
threatens her with death or serious bodily harm - defendants
use expert testimony to educate the jury about how the syn-
drome heightens the defendant's fear of her batterer and her
inability to retreat from the violent home.33 By showing that,
sponses characteristic of battered woman syndrome. Schneider & Jordan,
supra note 27, at 5, 28-29.
29. State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 257, 170 N.W.2d 104, 114 (1969) (citing
1 WHARTON, CumMAL LAW AND PRocEDuRE § 214).
30. Id. at 253-54, 170 N.W.2d at 111-12 (citing MuN. STAT. §§ 609.06,
609.065).
In Minnesota, the jury must judge the reasonableness of the defendant's
beliefs against those of a reasonable person "in light of the danger to be appre-
hended." Id. at 254, 170 N.W.2d at 112.
Some states have adopted a subjective standard of reasonableness, requir-
ing the jury to find only that, from the defendant's point of view, she reason-
ably believed she was in imminent danger of great bodily harm or death. See,
e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983).
The Minnesota test for reasonableness combines the objective and subjec-
tive standards. State v. Hennum, 428 N.W.2d 859, 866 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
The objective portion of the test requires the jury to compare the defendant to
a "reasonable person." I& The subjective portion of the test requires the jury
to consider that reasonable person's belief "in light of the danger to be appre-
hended." Id (quoting Boyce, 284 Minn. at 254, 170 N.W.2d at 112).
31. 'The key to the woman's self-defense... lies in the definition of what
perceptions are reasonable for a female victim of violence." Walker, Thyfault
& Browne, Beyond the Juror's Kew Battered Women, 7 VT. L. Rev. 1, 3-4
(1982). The authors note that several cases involving women defendants have
broadened the definition of self-defense and have recognized that women's re-
actions to violence may differ from men's reactions. Id. In the most signifi-
cant of those cases - State v. Wanrow - the Washington Supreme Court
held that when a woman is on trial for homicide and claims self-defense, the
instruction to the jury should use a female pronoun. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240-41,
559 P.2d 548, 558 (1977).
32. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 27, at 5.
33. Battered woman syndrome testimony provides a context within which
the jury can examine the defendant's state of mind by presenting the defend-
ant's perceptions and actions "in light of a pattern of experience that is com-
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because of the circumstances of their relationship, the defend-
ant had good reason to fear her batterer's approach, the defense
establishes the reasonableness of the defendant's fears.4 This
mon to many battered women." Macpherson, Ridolfi, Sternberg & Wiley,
Expert Testimony, in WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CAsES 87, 88 (E. Bochnak ed.
1981).
Before establishing how the syndrome affected the woman's state of mind,
the defense often must overcome the jury's misconceptions regarding battering
relationships. Walker's early work concentrated on disproving false beliefs
that the victim had precipitated her own assault. L. WALKER, supra note 15, at
18. According to Walker,
[t]he battered woman is pictured by most people as a small, fragile,
haggard person who might once have been pretty. She has several
small children, no job skills, and is economically dependent on her
husband. It is frequently assumed she is poor and from a minority
group. She is accustomed to living in violence, and her fearfulness
and passivity are emphasized above all. Although some battered wo-
men do fit this description, research proves it to be a false stereotype.
Idi
As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in State v. Kelly, testimony ex-
plaining the reasonableness of a woman staying with her batterer runs counter
to the "logical" conclusions a jury normally might draw. 97 N.J. 178, 206, 478
A.2d 364, 378 (1984).
[Expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome] is aimed at
an area where the purported common knowledge of the jury may be
very much mistaken, an area where the jurors' logic, drawn from
their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an
area where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard
their prior conclusions as being common myths rather than common
knowledge.
34. Battered women live in constant fear of their batterers because a "bat-
tered woman, by definition, lives with a man who has repeatedly demonstrated
his willingness to inflict pain on her and his ability to do so." C. GILLESPIE,
JusTIABLE HOnICIDE 124-25 (1989). Gillespie concludes that the severity and
frequency of violence in the relationship substantiates a defendant's claim that
she honestly and reasonably feared for her life. 'When the man who has
proved himself to be so brutal, so inexorable in his cruelty, begins to assault
her yet again, it is hard to imagine that anyone could doubt the genuineness
and reasonableness of her fear.. . ." Id at 127.
Some battered women advocates, however, prefer an analysis that
presents battered women as strong survivors, not as operating solely out of
fear. Schneider, Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testi-
mony on Battering, in REPRESENTNG... BATERED WOMEN WHO KILL 51,57-
58 (S. Johann & F. Osanka ed. 1989).
Advocates argue that because of their understanding of their batterers,
battered women can sense clearly when extreme violence is coming and know
implicitly when their batterer threatens their life. See, e.g., People v. Torres,
128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1985), in which the court noted-
[The expert] would testify that a battered woman, through her exten-
sive experience with prolonged physical abuse, learns to distinguish
between varying degrees of danger and violence. This expert explana-
tion.., would provide a basis for the jury to understand how at the
time of the shooting [the decedent's] violence had, in the defendant's
1030 [Vol. 74:1023
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testimony also supports a defendant's claim that she used a nec-
essary amount of force to protect herself.a5
Often, however, battered women do not kill their batterers
in typical self-defense settings. In many cases, women have
killed their batterers several hours or more after a violent at-
tack, sometimes when the batterer was asleep or just before a
probable attack.3 6 In these less traditional self-defense cases,
battered woman syndrome testimony serves a more crucial
function for the defense. Instead of just educating the jury
about the defendant's increased fear, the defense uses expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome to establish that the
defendant exhibited a set of specific psychological reactions to
her beatings and her batterer.3 7 These reactions, in turn, led
mind, passed from the "normal" and tolerable into the "abnormal"
and life-threatening.
Id. at 133, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362. This sort of evidence speaks to the objective
element of the self-defense claim, establishing that the woman's fear and be-
lief that deadly force was necessary were in fact reasonable, as only she could
know.
35. Battered women face problems with self-defense claims when they
use a weapon to defend themselves against an unarmed batterer. The law of
self-defense requires that the defendant's "election to kill" must be reasonable
in light of the apprehended danger. State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 254, 170
N.W.2d 104, 112 (1969) (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 609.06, 609.065); see also supra
notes 29-30 and accompanying text. Advocates for women claiming self-de-
fense emphasize the importance of conveying to the jury the disparity in
strength and force between men and women. Because men and women are
not physical equals, women may perceive a man's fist or body as a deadly
weapon. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 27, at 23. This conclusion is made
more clear when the defendant's attacker has repeatedly and severely beaten
her, and she thus understands the force he is capable of exerting against her.
Gillespie, supra note 34, at 130. Gillespie argues that a man and a woman may
be "sufficiently equalized" only when the woman has a weapon. Id. at 165.
36. See, ag., State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 248, 719 P.2d 1268, 1272 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1986) (defendant shot and stabbed her former husband as he lay
awake in bed); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814 (N.D. 1983) (defendant
stabbed sleeping husband); State v. Walker, 40 Wash. App. 658, 659, 700 P.2d
1168, 1171 (1985) (defendant stabbed her husband when his back was turned).
37. Expert testimony in this context shows that, because the defendant
suffered from battered woman syndrome, she rationally and reasonably be-
lieved she still was in danger even after her batterer fell asleep, or turned his
back toward her, or before he began to attack her. C. GuLLESPIE, supra note
34, at 159-60. Ordinarily, self-defense testimony establishes that the defend-
ant's immediate situation created in her mind a reasonable fear of imminent
harm. In battering cases, expert testimony posits that a long-term force be-
yond the immediate situation - namely, battered woman syndrome - af-
fected the defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing.
Overt physical attacks and threats to cause physical damage can result in
both physical suffering and "considerable psychological trauma" for battered
women. Rosewater, The Cainical and Courtroom Application of Battered Wo-
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her to believe she was in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily harm when she killed her batterer, even though some
time had passed since his last attack.38 In such "sleeping man"
cases,39 defense experts often testify that women suffering
from battered woman syndrome display a hypervigilence or hy-
persensitivity to their batterer's actions, which allows them to
anticipate in advance when a serious attack is imminent.40
B. THE TREND TO ADMIT BATIERED WOMAN SYNDROME
TESTIMONY
In the 1970s and early 1980s, women charged with murder-
ing their batterers began to assert self-defense claims based on
battered woman syndrome evidence. 41 The first question for
state courts became whether expert testimony regarding bat-
tered woman syndrome passed the common law42 and eviden-
men's Personality Assessments, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 86, 92 (D.
Sonkin ed. 1987). Rosewater argues that the batterer's earlier repeated threats
heighten the defendant's fear of imminent bodily harm at a particular mo-
ment, even when the attacker is not immediately threatening her. Id
38. Thyfault, Browne & Walker, When Battered Women Kil- Evaluation
and Eapert Witness Testimony Techniques, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL
71, 72-74 (D. Sonkin ed. 1987); see also Chapman v. State, 258 Ga. 214, 216, 367
S.E.2d 541, 543 (1988). In Chapman, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that
women who suffer from the syndrome believe their husbands will kill them
"although some time has elapsed since the husband's last assault 'against
them.' Id. at 215-16, 367 S.E.2d at 543. Expert testimony regarding the syn-
drome allows a jury to find that the defendant was honestly trying to defend
herself, notwithstanding a lapse of time or the fact that her husband was not
attacking her at the time of the killing. Id at 216, 367 S.E.2d at 543.
39. Courts use this term to describe cases in which women kill their hus-
bands some time after a serious physical attack. Battered women may kill
their husbands as they sleep, when their backs are turned, or when they are
across a room and not physically threatening the women. See, e-g., Chapman,
258 Ga. at 215-16, 367 S.E.2d at 543.
40. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, -, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167,
177 (1989) (citing the testimony of Dr. Lenore Walker that battered women
have a "hypervigilence to cues of any kind of impending violence . . .[that
makes them] more responsive to situations than somebody who has not been
battered"); State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 66, 716 P.2d 563, 566 (1986) (citing tes-
timony by Dr. Ann Bristow that battered women are "very sensitive to when
the situation is becoming more violent and to those things that precede
arguments").
41. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 626 (D.C. 1979) (de-
fendant claimed self-defense and offered evidence of battered woman syn-
drome); People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1070-71, 414 N.E.2d 196, 199
(1980) (same); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 519, 423 N.E.2d 137, 138
(1981) (same).
42. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977), contains the most
commonly cited test for admissibility of expert testimony. In Dyas, the court
stated the general rule that expert testimony is admissible if it passes a three-
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tiary43 tests for admissibility.
The first decision admitting expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome was Ibn-Tamas v. United States." In Tbn-
Tamas, the D.C. Circuit concluded that expert testimony on
part test: the subject matter of the testimony must be "beyond the ken of the
average layman," the expert witness must have sufficient expertise to make it
appear that the testimony will probably aid the trier of fact, and the state of
the scientific knowledge must permit an expert to assert a reasonable opinion.
Id. at 832.
Many courts rely on the "general acceptance" theory of Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), to determine whether the state of the sci-
entific knowledge is sufficient to satisfy the third prong of the Dyas test. In
Frye, the court held that the body of knowledge on which the expert bases his
or her opinion must be generally accepted in the expert's particular scientific
field. Id. at 1014.
43. Under both the Minnesota and Federal Rules of Evidence, the thresh-
old test for admissibility of evidence is whether the evidence is relevant. FED.
R. EVID. 402; MusN. R. EVID. 402. Subject to constitutional and statutory re-
straints, then, all relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Id. The premise of
the relevancy rule is that the most effective means of finding the truth is to
allow all evidence that helps to resolve an issue in the case. C. McCoRMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 184, at 540 (3d ed. 1984).
Under the Minnesota and federal rules, the definition of relevant evidence
consists of two parts, probative value and materiality. I& at § 185, at 541. The
first element of the relevancy test - probative value - is whether the evi-
dence tends to establish the proposition it is offered to prove. Id. Probative
evidence means "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401; MINN.
R. EvID. 401. The materiality element of the relevancy definition is whether
the evidence helps prove a proposition that is at issue in the case. C. McCoR-
mcm supra, at § 185, at 541.
The most significant statutory restraint on admissibility of relevant evi-
dence is Rule 403, which excludes evidence when its probative value is "sub-
stantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, misleading the jury, or waste of time. FED. R. EvID. 403; MINN. R. EVID.
403.
44. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979). Beverly Ibn-Tamas, a registered nurse,
killed her husband of four years, a doctor, after he beat her. Id. at 630-31.
Their relationship had been violent throughout their marriage. Id. at 629. On
the day of the killing, Beverly's husband beat her just after breakfast, while
she protested that he had promised not to hit her because she was pregnant.
Id. at 630. The beating stopped for a period and the decedent left the couple's
bedroom and went downstairs. The parties disputed the circumstances of the
shooting, but according to Beverly the doctor returned to the bedroom and re-
sumed the attack. Fearing that he would pick up the gun resting on their bu-
reau, she picked it up and fired a shot toward the bottom of the door to scare
him. He then left the room. When he reappeared on the stairway landing
Beverly fired two more shots, one of which struck her husband. He retreated
down the stairs and into a room. I& When Beverly entered the room she saw
him crouched over and thought he was holding a gun. Id. at 630-31. Beverly
fired again, hitting her husband in the head and killing him. Id. at 631.
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battered woman syndrome was both relevant to establish the
defendant's credibility45 and helpful to the jury. 6
Since the Ibn-Tamas decision, appellate courts in twenty-
six states have addressed the admissibility of expert testimony
on battered woman syndrome.47 Seventeen states have con-
45. Ia at 634. The court stated that such testimony "would have en-
hanced Mrs. Ibn-Tamas' general credibility" and "would have supported her
testimony that on the day of the shooting her husband's actions had provoked
a state of fear which led her to believe she was in imminent danger." Id
46. The court stated that the most important element of the Dyas test,
supra note 42, was the first element, that the evidence must be "so distinc-
tively related to some science" as to be beyond the understanding of the aver-
age juror. Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 632-33. The court explained that this
element requires that the testimony "provide a relevant insight which the jury
otherwise could not gain in evaluating appellant's self-defense testimony about
her relationship with her husband." Id at 633.
After briefly outlining the battered woman syndrome and the defense's
proposed expert testimony, the court held that the testimony "would have
supplied an interpretation of the facts which differed from the ordinary lay
perception," and therefore satisfied the first element of the Dyas test. Id. at
634-35.
The Ibn-Tamas court then turned to the other two elements of the Dyas
test: the subjective qualifications of the expert and the reliability of the ex-
pert's theory. The court concluded that it could not determine whether the
expert in the case was qualified because the evidence was insufficient, and re-
manded for retrial on that issue. Id at 640.
Applying the third element of the Dyas test, the court cited the Frye test
and held that the test should be interpreted to require that the particular
scientific methodology, not the results, be generally accepted. Id. at 638.
"[S]atisfaction of the third Dyas criterion begins - and ends - with a deter-
mination of whether there is general acceptance of a particular scientific
methodology, not an acceptance, beyond that, of particular study results based
on that methodology." IM
Based on the record, however, the court held that it could not assess the
general acceptance of the methodology, and remanded for determination of
that issue. Id. at 640. On remand, the trial court found that the methodology
of the expert's study was not generally accepted. Ibn-Tamas v. United States,
455 A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983) (discussing trial court's findings on remand). The
trial court apparently did not rule on the qualifications of the expert, perhaps
concluding that failure of the third Dyas element barred the evidence. See id.
Finally, the Ibn-Tamas court considered the Rule 403 problem of proba-
tive value versus prejudicial impact. 407 A.2d at 639. The court held that the
probative value of the expert's testimony would outweigh any prejudicial im-
pact. The court reasoned that evidence of the victim's violence toward the de-
fendant is always admissible in a homicide trial in which the defendant claims
self-defense, and the expert's testimony would show that the syndrome "may
have had a substantial bearing on [Mrs. Ibn-Tamas'] perceptions and behavior
at the time of the killing." Id. at 639.
47. In addition to the District of Columbia, the following states have ad-
dressed, in some form, the issue of expert testimony regarding battered wo-
man syndrome: California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
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cluded that the testimony is admissible,48 with varying require-
ments for foundation evidence and extent of admissibility.49
Only three states have excluded the testimony on the merits.s°
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wis-
consin and Wyoming. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text for case ci-
tations and analysis.
48. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, -, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 180
(1989) (admitting evidence for purpose of establishing defendant's state of
mind regarding perceived danger, imminence, and force necessary to protect
herself); Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (admit-
ting evidence to support self-defense claim); Chapman v. State, 258 Ga. 214,
215-16, 367 S.E.2d 541, 543 (1988) (admitting evidence to support claim of self-
defense in "sleeping man" setting); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d
678, 683 (1981) (permitting evidence to prove defendant's claim of self-de-
fense); People v. Minnis, 118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 356-57, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217 (1983)
(admitting evidence to assist jury in understanding why defendant dismem-
bered victim's body after killing); State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 646, 763 P.2d
572, 577 (1988) (admitting evidence to establish reasonableness of defendant's
perception of imminent danger); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 467, 693 P.2d
475, 479 (1985) (admitting evidence to prove the nature and effect of wife beat-
ing on mental state); Commonwealth v. Craig, No. 88-SC-675-DG (Ky. Jan. 18,
1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ky file) (admitting testimony as to whether de-
fendant suffered from syndrome at time of shooting); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d
892, 894 (Me. 1981) (admitting testimony to explain defendant's perceptions
and behavior at the time of the killing); State v. Briand, 130 N.H. 650, 651, 653-
57, 547 A.2d 235, 237-41 (1988) (per curiam) (assuming admissibility and up-
holding trial court's order of adverse examination of defendant); State v.
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 207, 478 A.2d 364, 375-76, 377 (1984) "(finding testimony rele-
vant to honesty and reasonableness of defendant's belief); State v. Gallegos,
104 N.M. 247, 253, 719 P.2d 1268, 1274 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming admissi-
bility of testimony at trial and recognizing general acceptance of syndrome in
field of psychology); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 135, 488 N.Y.S.2d
358, 362 (Crim. Ct. 1985) (admitting testimony to counter jury's commonsense
conclusion that reasonable person would have left abusive situation); State v.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819-20 (N.D. 1983) (acknowledging admission of evi-
dence at trial and clarifying that battered woman syndrome supports self-de-
fense claim, and is not a defense in itself); Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 319-
20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (admitting evidence to establish defendant's fear of
victim); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984) (admit-
ting evidence as relevant to defendant's perception and behavior at time of
killing); State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558, 564 (W. Va. 1987) (admitting testimony
to explain psychological basis for syndrome and to show defendant fit syn-
drome); State v. Landis, No. 86-0892-CR (Wis. Ct. App. July 29, 1987)
(WESTLAW, Allstates database) (unpublished opinion approving trial court's
discretion to admit battered woman syndrome testimony). Missouri allows ex-
pert testimony on battered woman syndrome by statute. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 563.033 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
49. See, e.g. Anaya, 438 A.2d at 894 (admitting testimony only when psy-
chologist is qualified and defendant establishes her identity as a battered wo-
man); Allery, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 316 (same).
50. See State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 665 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (excluding
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome on theory that syndrome sup-
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In five states, the issue appears to be undecided, because courts
in those states rejected the testimony based only on the narrow
facts of the cases before them.51
C. DEFENDANT-SPECIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
General battered woman syndrome testimony includes
only a description of the syndrome, with no diagnosis of the de-
fendant. Defendant-specific testimony, on the other hand, in-
cludes both the general description and an analysis of the
extent to which the defendant suffers from the syndrome. Few
courts have drawn a distinction between defendant-specific tes-
timony and general testimony. Courts that have addressed the
issue have held that the expert must preliminarily link the syn-
drome to the defendant as a foundation to testifying about the
effects of the syndrome in general.5 2
Several courts have held that an expert witness must tes-
tify that the defendant suffers from the syndrome to establish
the relevancy of general syndrome evidence.53 In State v.
ported impermissible defense of "partial responsibility"); State v. Thomas, 66
Ohio St. 2d 518, 520-21, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (1981) (excluding testimony for
several reasons, including immateriality of evidence to defendant's claim of
self-defense); Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 1987) (excluding testi-
mony because subject matter was not beyond understanding of jury); Buhrle v.
State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981) (excluding testimony because scientific
validity of testimony was not established).
51. See Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (excluding
evidence because defendant did not establish foundation by appreciable evi-
dence of the victim's aggression); Commonwealth v. Moore, 25 Mass. App. Ct.
63, 66-67, 68-69, 514 N.E.2d 1342, 1344-45, 1345 (1987) (excluding evidence be-
cause it was not proffered to support claim of self-defense, as defendant denied
killing altogether); State v. Dannels, 226 Mont. 80, 86, 734 P.2d 188, 192-93
(1987) (barring evidence because defendant sought to explain why she lied to
police, not to support claim of self-defense); State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253,
260-66, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13-16 (1989) (rejecting a self-defense claim based on bat-
tered woman syndrome expert testimony because defendant did not establish
foundation that victim posed threat of imminent death or great bodily harm);
State v. Moore, 72 Or. App. 454, 458, 695 P.2d 985, 987 (1985) (excluding evi-
dence because expert's last contact with defendant was seven months before
killing, thus testimony was too remote from shooting to be probative).
52. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals appears to be the only court, other
than the Minnesota Supreme Court, to have limited expert testimony to gen-
eral testimony. State v. Landis, No. 86-0892-CR (Wis. Ct. App. July 29, 1987)
(WESTLAW, Allstates database). The Wisconsin court, however, confined its
limitation to the facts, excluding the specific testimony because the expert had
limited contact with the defendant, had not diagnosed the defendant's condi-
tion, and was not present when the defendant testified. Id The court did not
issue a general rule limiting expert testimony to a general description of the
syndrome. Id.
53. People v. White, 90 IMl. App. 3d 1067, 1072, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (App.
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Thomas,5 4 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the testimony of
an expert about battered woman syndrome was inadmissible,
partly because the expert had no personal contact with the de-
fendant and the defendant submitted no evidence that she suf-
fered from the syndrome.- Similarly, in State v. AIlery,- the
Supreme Court of Washington held that expert testimony was
admissible only when the expert was qualified to testify about
the syndrome and when the defendant established herself as a
battered woman.5 7
Both Thomas and Allery suggest that, without specific tes-
timony that the defendant suffers from the syndrome, the de-
fense does not establish a foundation for the relevance of
general syndrome testimony. In People v. White,-s an Illinois
appellate court held battered woman syndrome testimony irrel-
evant unless such testimony was linked to the defendant.59 In
State v. Hennum,6° the Minnesota Supreme Court contradicted
this line of cases and became the first court to hold that, in all
battered woman syndrome cases, general syndrome evidence is
admissible but testimony specific to the defendant is not.6'
Although no court has yet ruled non-defendant-specific expert
testimony inadmissible on other evidentiary grounds, general
battered woman syndrome testimony also is vulnerable to the
charge that the danger of unfairly prejudicing or misleading the
jury substantially outweighs its probative value.62
D. ADVERSE MENTAL EXAM ATIONS
Because expert testimony about battered woman syndrome
often is based on psychological evidence, admitting such testi-
Ct. 1980); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981); State v. Thomas, 66
Ohio St. 2d 518, 520, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d
591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984).
54. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
55. Id- at 520, 423 N.E.2d at 139.
56. 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
57. Id at 597, 682 P.2d at 316. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
reached the same conclusion in State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981).
58. 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980).
59. Id at 1072, 414 N.E.2d at 200.
60. 441 N.W.2d 793 (iIinn. 1989).
61. 1& at 798-99. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in an unpublished opin-
ion, confined battered woman syndrome testimony to a general description of
the syndrome, but limited its holding to the facts of the case. The court did not
issue a rule that, in all battered woman syndrome cases, experts must confine
their testimony to a general description. State v. Landis, No. 86-0892-CR (Wis.
Ct. App. July 29, 1987) (WESTLAW, Alistates database).
62. See supra note 43.
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mony raises the issue whether the prosecution may compel an
adverse mental examination of the defendant.63 In the context
of the insanity defense, both the Minnesota and Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide that a defendant who introduces
psychological testimony in support of a claim of impaired
mental state must submit to an adverse examination by a court-
appointed expert. 4 Because of the psychological nature of the
63. The argument for adverse mental examinations arises most often in
cases in which the defendant presents an insanity defense. In such cases the
prosecution commonly argues that, without an adverse expert examination of
the defendant, the state would be unable to adequately rebut the defense's ex-
pert testimony on the defendant's mental state. For example, in United States
v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968), the court held that "we would unduly
limit the ability of a court to find the truth in a criminal case where sanity is
an issue were we to turn our backs on the tool of expert medical knowledge."
i'd at 723. The court further stated that cross-examination, lay testimony, and
hypothetical testimony by experts would be insufficient to rebut direct expert
testimony about the defendant's state of mind. Id. at 725.
64. FED. R. CRim. P. 12.2(b), (c); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02, Subd. 1.
The federal rule has two parts, notice and compelled examination. A de-
fendant who intends to introduce expert testimony about a mental condition
bearing on guilt must notify the state of such an intention. FED. R. CRIM. P.
12.2(b). In an "appropriate case", the court may order an adverse examination
of the defendant. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c). At least one court has held that an
"appropriate case" includes any case in which the defendant gives notice pur-
suant to Rule 12.2(b). United States v. Steinberg, 428 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D. Conn.
1977). Under the Steinberg holding, whenever a defendant intends to intro-
duce evidence regarding a mental condition bearing on her guilt, a court may
order an adverse examination of the defendant. The Steinberg court reasoned
that this reading of the rule furthered the rule's objective of giving the govern-
ment "time to meet the issue, which will usually require reliance upon expert
testimony." Id. (citing FED. R. C0IM. P. 12.2(c), advisory committee's note).
Because of the federal rule's broad language referring to "any... mental
condition of the defendant bearing upon the issue of guilt," FED. R. CRIa. P.
12.2(b), the rule may apply to situations beyond the simple insanity context.
Several cases, however, have interpreted Rule 12.2(b) narrowly, only applying
it to insanity defenses. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 518 (3d Cir.
1981) (holding that Rule 12.2(b) did not apply when a defendant asserted an
entrapment defense); United States v. Webb, 625 F.2d 709, 710-11 (5th Cir.
1980) (stating that Rule 12.2(b) did not cover expert testimony positing that
defendant lacked "propensity to commit a violent act" because evidence did
not relate to criminal intent of defendant). Other circuits, however, have con-
cluded that the rule has broader coverage. See, e.g., United States v. Staggs,
553 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that evidence indicating that de-
fendant did not subjectively intend to put assault victim in apprehension of
bodily harm fell under requirements of Rule 12.2(b)); United States v. Olson,
576 F.2d 1267, 1273 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that drug therapist's expert testi-
mony concerning the effect of drug and alcohol abuse upon defendant's mental
state fell under Rule 12.2(b)). In response to this conflict among circuits, Rule
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evidence,65 prosecutors in other states recently have requested
adverse examinations in cases involving battered woman
syndrome.6
12.2(b) was amended in 1983 to include the "any mental condition" language.
FED. R. CruM. P. 12.2(b), comment to 1983 Amendment.
The Minnesota adverse examination rule is much narrower than the fed-
eral rule. Rule 20.02 currently reads as follows:
Subd. 1. Authority of Court to Order Examination. The court having
trial jurisdiction over the offense charged may order a mental exami-
nation of the defendant when the defense has notified the prosecuting
attorney pursuant to Rule 9.02, subd. 1(3)(a) of an intention to assert
a defense of mental illness or deficiency, when the defendant in a mis-
demeanor case pleads not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental
deficiency, or when at the trial of the case, the defendant offers evi-
dence of such mental condition.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02. (Rule 9.02, referred to in Rule 20.02, provides that a
defendant must inform the prosecuting attorney in writing of any defense the
defendant intends to use at trial. MINN. R. ClUM. P. 9.02, Subd. 1(3)(a). The
rule further requires that the defendant supply the prosecutor with the names
and addresses of witnesses. Ii)
Rule 90.02 authorizes a trial court to order a mental examination of the
defendant only when the defendant asserts a defense of mental illness or defi-
ciency. Thus, if a defendant merely introduces psychological testimony, Rule
20.02 is inapplicable. If that psychological testimony is the defendant's de-
fense, however, the rule applies. Id
The Minnesota procedural rule is especially narrow considering state com-
mon law precedent regarding adverse examinations. Under State v. Olson, 274
Minn. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966), absent a statute clearly authorizing an ad-
verse examination and offering guidelines to protect the fifth amendment
rights of the defendant, courts have no inherent authority to order an adverse
mental examination of a defendant. Id. at 233, 143 N.W.2d at 75. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court decided Olson before the enactment of Rule 20.02.
Rule 20.02 does provide the kind of procedural safeguards, in the insanity
context, that the Olson decision maintained are necessary to avoid constitu-
tional challenge. The rule requires that the court appoint a qualified psychia-
trist, clinical psychologist, or physician experienced in the field of mental
illness to examine the defendant. MINN. R. CR.M. P. 20.02, Subd. 2. Upon a
showing of special need, the court may order the defendant confined to a hos-
pital or other facility for up to 60 days for purposes of the examination. Id. At
the request of a defendant who retains a qualified psychiatrist, clinical psy-
chologist, or physician experienced in the field of mental illness, the court
must allow the defendant's expert to be present at any adverse examination,
and to conduct his own examination of the defendant. Id The state's expert
must file a written report of the examination with the court, and the judge
must provide copies to the prosecution and the defense. MINN. R. CRIM. P.
20.02, Subd. 4. Subdivision 4 lists information that must be included in the re-
port. Id. Finally, evidence from the examination may be used only if the de-
fendant puts her mental condition at issue. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02, Subd. 5.
65. Battered woman syndrome consists of a set of complex psychological
symptoms that are similar to symptoms of mental illness. See supra notes 20-
26 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., State v. Briand, 130 N.H. 650, 651, 547 A.2d 235, 236 (1988)
(per curiam) (involving request for an adverse examination by prosecution af-
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Although defendants frequently contend that adverse psy-
chological examinations violate their fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination, 7 that argument appears to have
failed in the United States Supreme Court.6s The Supreme
Court has noted that when a defendant submits evidence based
on a psychological examination, the state may be forced to rely
on an adverse examination to obtain satisfactory rebuttal evi-
dence.69 The Supreme Court also has held that a defendant
waives her fifth amendment privilege regarding psychological
examination by introducing evidence from a friendly examina-
tion and placing her mental state at issue.70
The federal rule covering adverse examinations of the de-
ter defendant, who shot husband as he slept, claimed self-defense and offered
testimony from a psychologist who had interviewed the defendant).
67. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 109 S. Ct. 3146, 3147 (1989) (analyzing de-
fendant's claim that admitting evidence from an adverse examination received
during the penalty stage of his trial violated his fifth amendment rights); State
v. Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 226, 143 N.W.2d 69, 71 (1966) (claiming temporary in-
sanity, defendant in murder case argued that adverse examination violated his
right against self-incrimination).
68. The Supreme Court has acknowledged, without criticism, the view of
several circuit courts that an adverse examination ordered in response to a de-
fendant's use of expert testimony based on a psychological examination does
not violate a defendant's fifth amendment rights. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454, 465 (1981).
69. In Estelle the Court stated-
When a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces sup-
porting psychological testimony, his silence may deprive the State of
the only effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue
that he interjected into the case. Accordingly, several Courts of Ap-
peals have held that, under such circumstances, a defendant can be
required to submit to a sanity examination conducted by the prosecu-
tion's psychiatrist.
451 U.S. at 465. Similarly, in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987), the
Supreme Court referred to the above-quoted language from Estelle and noted
that Buchanan's "entire defense strategy" was to establish a defense based on
"extreme emotional disturbance." I& at 422-23. The Court concluded that the
prosecution could not respond without presenting other psychological evi-
dence. I& at 422-23; see also Powell v. Texas, 109 S. Ct. at 3149 (acknowledging
Estelle conclusion that when a defendant introduces evidence based on a psy-
chological examination, the prosecution's only effective means of rebuttal de-
rives from an adverse examination).
70. Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 422-23. The Court held that a defendant waives
her fifth amendment rights when she requests a psychological examination to
prove a defense based on her mental status. Id The Court in Powell cited
with approval a Fifth Circuit opinion holding that a defendant's use of psycho-
logical testimony constituted a waiver just as if the defendant had herself
taken the stand. Powell, 109 S. Ct. at 3149 (citing Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d
692, 701-02 & n.22 (1987)).
At least one state has approved the use of adverse examinations in the
battered woman syndrome context based on this line of Supreme Court fifth
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fendant authorizes such examinations not only in the insanity
setting, but whenever the defendant offers evidence about a
mental condition that bears on the defendant's guilt.7 1
Although commentators tend to avoid mental illness or defi-
ciency terminology when advocating the use of battered woman
syndrome testimony to establish self-defense, 72 expert testi-
mony in this area relies heavily on psychological data and per-
sonal interviews with the defendant,73 and therefore apparently
amendment decisions. See State v. Briand, 130 N.H. 650, 657, 547 A.2d 235, 240
(1988) (per curiam); see also infra note 74.
71. See supra note 64. The use of psychological data is the key to deciding
whether an adverse examination is appropriate, for it is the nature of the testi-
mony, not the nature of the defense, that justifies the adverse examination as
an evidentiary tool. If a defendant introduces psychological testimony and the
prosecution is prevented from rebutting that testimony through the results of
an adverse examination,
the government... would have access to only three kinds of proof:
cross-examination of defendant's experts, lay testimony, and testi-
mony of government experts predicated upon courtroom observations
and hypothetical questions. -Medical science... deems these poor and
unsatisfactory substitutes for testimony based upon prolonged and in-
timate interviews between the psychiatrist and the defendant.
United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 1968).
72. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. "[A]s we learn more
about battered women, we know that those who kill do not appear to be men-
tally ill, but rather seem to be reacting situationally to the level of violence
perpetrated against them and attempting to protect their lives and those of
their children." Thyfault, Browne & Walker, supra note 38, at 73.
Use of self-defense reflects a dissatisfaction with the use of traditional
mental illness or deficiency defenses. Battered women advocates argue that
mental state defenses suggest that the defendant was insane or irrational
when she killed her batterer, Schneider & Jordan, supra note 27, at 28, while
battered woman syndrome studies indicate the opposite: that battered women
may act reasonably when they kill their batterers. I&i at 5. Advocates also
seek to avoid the consequences that might result from a finding of mental in-
capacity or illness. In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), for example,
the Supreme Court held that a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity could
be committed for an indeterminate length of time after acquittal. Id. at 370.
73. Despite differences between a mental deficiency defense and a claim
of self-defense based on battered woman syndrome, the testimony proffered in
these two settings is much the same. In self-defense, as noted above, battered
women defendants seek to establish that they acted reasonably, not that they
suffered from a delusion or other mental deficiency that caused them irration-
ally to kill their batterers. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. De-
spite the defendant's goal of proving reasonableness, however, the testimony
necessary to explain battered woman syndrome and its effect on the defendant
requires use of psychological data similar to the data used to establish insanity.
Experts evaluate battered women using questionnaires, "mental-status"
examinations, and standardized psychological scales to compare the woman's
psychosocial status to those of other women suffering from the syndrome.
Thyfault, Browne & Walker, supra note 38, at 75. Experts also make use of
personality assessments such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inven-
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falls within the scope of the federal rule.
At least two states explicitly allow adverse examinations in
the battered woman syndrome context. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court has authorized adverse mental examinations of
defendants who introduce battered woman syndrome testi-
mony, reasoning that prosecutors need this evidence to fairly
present their case, just as they do in cases in which defendants
plead insanity.74 A Missouri statute provides both for the ad-
tory (MMPI) to measure the battered woman's fear, anger, confusion, aliena-
tion, and other emotions. Rosewater, sup= note 37, at 87-89. The use of
psychological tests and standards in evaluating battered women may create the
mistaken impression that battered women suffer from schizophrenia, emo-
tional disturbance, or a character disorder. Id. at 90. Often the psychological
and personality profile of a battered woman is indistinguishable from the clas-
sic chronic schizophrenic profile. I& Rosewater suggests that what appear to
be symptoms of mental illness really are the effects of battering, and that
proper testimony about the symptoms or effects can explain to the jury that
the defendant reasonably feared for her life even after an attack was over, or
before it began. Id. at 86-87, 92-93; see also L. WALRxm, supra note 17, at 14-22
(describing the psychological and personality characteristics of battered
women).
74. State v. Briand, 130 N.H. 650, 657, 547 A.2d 235, 240 (1988) (per
curiam). The facts and procedural posture of Briand closely resemble those of
Hennum. In Briand, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder in
the shooting death of her husband. Md. at 651, 547 A.2d at 236. Briand offered
the testimony of Dr. Charles Ewing, a psychologist, to establish that she suf-
fered from battered woman syndrome and that she acted in self-defense. The
prosecution requested an adverse examination of Briand, but the trial court
denied the request, stating that it lacked inherent authority to issue such an
order. The state brought an interlocutory appeal asking the New Hampshire
Supreme Court to permit an adverse examination. Ird
The New Hampshire Supreme Court first affirmed the inherent authority
of trial courts to order adverse examinations, subject to appropriate constitu-
tional limitations. I& at 653, 547 A.2d at 237. The court then held that an ad-
verse examination does not violate a defendant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination when the defendant raises defenses "typically re-
quiring psychiatric evidence." Id- at 652, 547 A.2d at 237 (citing People v.
Atwood, 101 Misc. 2d 291, 294, 420 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1005 (Trial Term 1979) (ex-
treme emotional disturbance)); see also People v. Danis, 31 Cal. App. 3d 782,
786-87, 107 Cal. Rptr. 675, 678-79 (1973) (diminished capacity).
The court cited two rationales for its conclusion that no fifth amendment
violation occurred. First, the court noted that courts admit expert testimony
because lay jurors are presumed to be unable to evaluate "specialized evi-
dence." Id- at 653, 547 A.2d at 237. Thus, if a court allows the defense to pres-
ent expert testimony to enlighten jurors regarding a complex issue, the
prosecution must be given an equal opportunity to present expert witnesses.
The court noted that the trier of fact could evaluate intelligently all evidence
in a battered woman syndrome case "only if the state has an opportunity to
produce evidence of a similar quality in rebuttal." Id Second, the court held
that a defendant who introduces psychological testimony waives the right
against self-incrimination because the expert's opinion is based on the defend-
ant's account of the relevant events of her history and state of mind at the
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niissibility of battered woman syndrome testimony and for ad-
verse examinations in that context. 75
Although most states have resolved the question of
whether to admit expert testimony on battered woman syn-
drome in favor of admissibility, as defendants increasingly in-
troduce this testimony, questions about its role in criminal
trials continue to arise. It is in that context that the Minnesota
Supreme Court's Hennum decision is significant.
II. STATE v. HENNUM: REJECTION OF BOTH
DEFENDANT-SPECIFIC TESTIMONY AND
ADVERSE MENTAL EXAMINATIONS
State v. Hennum raised two issues that are central to the
use of battered woman syndrome testimony to establish self-de-
fense: whether defense experts may testify that the defendant
suffers from battered woman syndrome, and whether the pros-
ecution may request and be granted an adverse examination of
the defendant. For that reason, the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision in Hennum breaks new ground in the area of
battered woman syndrome jurisprudence.
Throughout their thirteen-year marriage, Robert Hennum
beat JoAnn Hennum.76 JoAnn shot Robert shortly after Rob-
ert severely beat her in front of their grandchild and several
neighbor children. On the night of the killing, Robert Hennum
came home after drinking heavily. He dumped oatmeal on
JoAnn's head, dragged her around the kitchen by her hair,
ripped her shirt, and pinned her to the floor by the throat. Af-
ter a brief pause, Robert threw a piece of firewood, a car part,
and a rocking chair at JoAnn. He then picked up the couple's
six-month-old grandchild by the arm and threw him down on
the couch, ordering him to be quiet. He pulled JoAnn by the
hair again, tore a door off the closet and threw the door at
JoAnn. Finally, he threw a chair at JoAnn, broke a cupboard
time of the killing. Id. at 655, 547 A.2d at 239. The court concluded that be-
cause "a defendant would waive his privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion if he took the stand and made those same statements himself, his decision
to introduce his account of relevant facts indirectly through an expert witness
should likewise be treated as a waiver .... " I&
75. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (Vernon Supp. 1990). The statute requires a
defendant who intends to submit expert battered woman syndrome testimony
to file advance notice of the testimony with the court. The trial court then is
authorized to appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine the defendant.
CE
76. State v. Hennuni, 441 N.W.2d 793, 795 (Minn. 1989).
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door and threw more firewood. Robert then went into the bed-
room to sleep. After Robert went into the bedroom, JoAnn
picked up a rifle that had earlier fallen out of the closet and
loaded it. She went into the bedroom, closed her eyes, and
fired. Robert died of a gunshot wound to the head. At trial,
JoAnn claimed that she only intended to scare her husband.77
JoAnn asserted that she acted in self-defense, and at trial
sought to introduce expert testimony about battered woman
syndrome.78 The trial court admitted the testimony.79 Dr.
Lynn Powers, the defense expert, testified generally about bat-
tered woman syndrome and stated that JoAnn suffered from a
severe case of the syndrome.8 0
Over a defense objection, the trial court ruled that for the
prosecution to properly rebut JoAnn's expert testimony, a
court-appointed expert must be able to conduct an adverse ex-
amination of JoAnn.8s After that examination, the court-ap-
pointed expert testified that JoAnn did not suffer from the
syndrome, but rather that she was emotionally disturbed and
suffering from depression, dependence on alcohol, and an "anti-
social personality disorder."8 2
The jury found JoAnn guilty of second-degree felony mur-
der,83 and JoAnn appealed. On appeal, the central issue was
whether the trial court had the authority to order an adverse
psychological examination.84 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
77. Id. at 795-97.
78. Id. at 797.
79. Id. The trial court agreed to admit the testimony only on the condi-
tion that JoAnn submit to an adverse examination by a state-appointed expert.
Id. In its memorandum attached to the adverse examination order, the trial
court noted that JoAnn's state of mind and subjective beliefs at the time of the
killing were integral to her self-defense theory. 441 N.W.2d at 797.
80. State v. Hennum, 428 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
81. Id The trial court provided that JoAnn's expert, Dr. Lynn Powers,
could be present to observe the adverse examination. Id The trial court also
instructed the parties that the state expert could not question JoAnn about
the acts for which she was on trial. Id. at 868. The trial court did not, how-
ever, place any restrictions on the record. Id.
82. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 797.
83. Id. MINN. STAT. § 609.19 states that a defendant is guilty of second-de-
gree felony-murder if she kills another, without intent, while committing or
attempting to commit a felony offense. MINN. STAT. § 609.19 (1988). Although
neither the Minnesota Court of Appeals nor the Minnesota Supreme Court
stated the underlying felony supporting JoAnn's felony murder convictioA, it
presumably was assault, because JoAnn testified that she intended to scare
her husband by firing a shot into the bedroom. See supra note 77 and accom-
panying text.
84. 428 N.W.2d at 867-70; 441 N.W.2d at 799-800.
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analyzed both common law and statutory rules governing ad-
verse examination and concluded that the court could not com-
pel Hennum to undergo an adverse mental examinationas The
court held that Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.02
gave the trial court authority to order such an examination
only when the defendant claimed a defense of mental illness or
deficiency.8 Because Hennum claimed self-defense and not a
defense of mental illness or deficiency, the court of appeals
held Rule 20.02 to be inapplicable.8 7 The court of appeals also
held that the trial court had no inherent judicial authority to
order an adverse examinationsa In dicta, the court noted that
it believed admission of testimony about battered woman syn-
drome was improper because the jury was as capable as an ex-
pert to decide whether the defendant acted in self-defense. 89
85. 428 N.W.2d at 867-68.
86. Id. at 867 (citing MNN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02); see also supra note 64.
87. d.
88. I& at 868 (citing State v. Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 233, 143 N.W.2d 69, 75
(1966)). On the issue of adverse examination, the state argued that the trial
court had inherent power to order such an examination. Id at 867-68. 'The
state notes that 'the determination of what constitutes proper rebuttal evi-
dence rests almost wholly in the discretion of the trial court."' Id (citing
State v. Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Minn. 1984)). In the state's brief to the
court of appeals, the prosecution argued that the trial court had broad discre-
tion regarding rebuttal evidence and the admissibility of expert testimony, giv-
ing the court discretion to order an adverse examination. Respondent's Brief
at 34-35, State v. Hennum, 428 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (No. C5-87-
1524).
The court of appeals disagreed, resting its decision on State v. Olson, 274
Minn. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966). See supra note 64. Based on Olson, the court
of appeals ruled that absent a statute or procedural rule authorizing the com-
pelled adverse examination of a defendant claiming self-defense, the court had
no inherent authority to order an adverse mental examination. 428 N.W.2d at
868 (citing Olson, 274 Minn. at 233, 143. N.W.2d at 75).
The court of appeals also objected to the lack of procedural safeguards
provided in the trial judge's order. I&; see also supra note 64 (describing pro-
cedural safeguards under Rule 20.02). The trial court ordered JoAnn to un-
dergo an adverse examination, but did not place the strict limits of rule 20.02
on the examination or the use of the results of the examination at trial. Hen-
num, 428 N.W.2d at 868. The court of appeals explained:
The trial court, in an apparent attempt to address the constitutional
problems in compelling a defendant to answer questions posed by a
state-appointed expert, seems to have instructed the parties that the
examination of the defendant was not to include questions regarding
the acts for which JoAnn was on trial. The court did not, however,
place any restrictions on the record; there was no order which would
indicate the trial court provided the types of protection necessary
under rule 20.02.
89. The court of appeals cited State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn.
1982), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court excluded expert testimony re-
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The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the court of ap-
peals that it was improper for the trial court to order an ad-
verse mental examination when a defendant claims self-
defense, reasoning that neither the common law nor rules of
criminal procedure authorized an adverse examination.90 The
court added that the legislature could best decide whether to
authorize adverse examinations outside of the insanity
context.9 1
Because the trial court's decision to admit battered woman
syndrome testimony precipitated the issue of adverse psycho-
logical examination, and because the court of appeals had ad-
dressed the admissibility of such testimony, the supreme court
also addressed the issue.9 2 The court held that battered woman
syndrome testimony was admissible, but only to a limited ex-
tent.93 Experts could give only a general description of the syn-
drome, but could not make a subjective conclusion: whether the
defendant suffered from the syndrome. 4 The only evidence
the defense could offer to show that the defendant suffered
from battered woman syndrome was testimony that the defend-
ant possessed certain characteristics consistent with the syn-
drome, leaving the jury to decide whether the defendant
actually suffered from battered woman syndrome.95 Presuma-
garding "rape trauma syndrome" and held that the jury was capable of judg-
ing, without the help of an expert, whether the defendant acted in self-
defense. Hennum, 428 N.W.2d at 870.
90. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 799-800.
91. Id.
92. To decide the case before them, the court did not need to reach this
issue, but chose to do so. Id. at 797-800.
93. 441 N.W.2d at 797-99. The supreme court disagreed with the court of
appeals on the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony on battered wo-
man syndrome. Relying on decisions of other states, the court held that the
testimony was beyond the understanding of the average person and, conse-
quently, would be helpful to the jury. Id. at 798. The court did not use the
Dyas test explicitly, see supra note 42, but noted that unlike the rape trauma
syndrome in Saldana, research about battered woman syndrome was generally
accepted in the scientific community. 441 N.W.2d at 798-99. The court then
noted, without analysis, that other states had held the testimony to be both
helpful and beyond the understanding of the average juror. Id.
94. 441 N.W.2d at 799. The court did not prohibit defendant-specific testi-
mony altogether, but said both sides could present witnesses to testify as to the
defendant's characteristics that matched or contrasted with battered woman
syndrome. Id.
95. Id. The opinion does not make clear whether this testimony linking
characteristics of the defendant to battered woman syndrome may be from ex-
perts, or whether it must be confined to that of non-experts. Because the
court disallowed expert testimony that would require a psychological examina-
tion of the defendant, however, a safe conclusion is that the court meant that
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bly, this testimony would be by non-experts familiar with the
defendant.9
The primary reason for this limitation, according to the
court, was that it would eliminate the need for an adverse
mental examination of the defendant.9 Importantly, the
supreme court offered no independent legal rationale for limit-
ing expert battered woman syndrome testimony to an objective
explanation of the syndrome. Instead, the court merely stated
the limitation, mandating that the trier of fact determine
whether the defendant suffered from the syndrome, and noting
that the limit would obviate the need for an adverse
examination.9 8
III. A BETTER SOLUTION TO THE EVIDENTIARY
PROBLEM RAISED BY HENNUM: DEFENDANT-
SPECIFIC TESTIMONY AND ADVERSE
EXAMINATION
The Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Hennum con-
tained two significant holdings. The court held that experts
called to testify about battered woman syndrome may testify
only about the syndrome generally, and not about its relation-
ship to the defendant.99 The court also held that trial courts
may not order defendants who introduce general psychological
testimony about battered woman syndrome to undergo adverse
either nonexperts or experts who had worked with battered women, but had
not examined the defendant, could testify as to the overt characteristics of the
defendant that matched the syndrome. The court's reasoning indicates, how-
ever, that an expert could not testify that aspects of the defendant's psycholog-
ical profile or personality traits, which the expert could derive only through
psychological examination, matched the profile, because such testimony would
again raise the issue of an adverse mental examination. See i&
96. See supra note 95.
97. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 799. The court reasoned that if the defense
expert did not testify about the defendant's psychological profile, the defense
expert would not have to examine the defendant. Therefore, the prosecution
would not need an adverse examination to rebut the testimony.
98. Id. The court's brief comment that diagnosis of the defendant should
be left to the jury may be attacked on two grounds. First, MINN. R. EviD. 704
states that "[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise ad-
missible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be de-
cided by the trier of fact." Furthermore, the very reason expert testimony is
admissible is because the jury is ill-equipped to understand for itself the sub-
ject matter of the expert testimony. See supra notes 42, 46. The jury cannot,
then, diagnose a victim of the syndrome based on an expert's purely objective
description of the syndrome. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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mental examinations. 1° °
The court's first holding on defendant-specific testimony is
based not on a legal theory that such testimony is inadmissible,
but rather on the simple reasoning that, by removing defend-
ant-specific testimony altogether, the court would not have to
address the issue of adverse examinations.' 0 ' There is no legal
rationale supporting prohibition of defendant-specific testi-
mony. Furthermore, the supreme court's holding defies several
well-established theories of evidence.
The supreme court was correct that its ban of defendant-
specific testimony removed the need for an adverse examina-
tion. 0 2 The rationale for adverse examinations is that the pros-
ecution has no adequate means of rebutting testimony derived
from a psychological examination of the defendant, except by
requesting an adverse examination. 0 3 Thus, if the defense ex-
pert does not examine the defendant, the prosecution will not
need an adverse examination. Under the Hennum rule, the de-
fense expert will not examine the defendant, because she may
not testify as to whether or not the defendant suffers from the
syndrome.104
This Comment disagrees with the Minnesota Supreme
Court's rejection of expert defendant-specific testimony. The
sections that follow demonstrate that the court's decision is il-
logical and threatens to undermine any use of battered woman
syndrome evidence. The court's holding that defense experts
may not present psychological evidence about the defendant
conveniently avoids the question of adverse psychological ex-
aminations. This Comment concludes that such examinations
are both appropriate and constitutional, and proposes a revised
rule of criminal procedure to authorize examinations in the
battered woman syndrome area.
100. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
101. In future battered woman syndrome cases, expert medical exami-
nation of a defendant will not be necessary since we hold today that
expert testimony as to the ultimate fact of whether a particular de-
fendant suffers from the syndrome will be inadmissible. It will be up
to the trier of fact to make that finding or conclusion.
Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 800.
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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A. EVIDENTIARY RATIONALE FOR DEFENDANT-SPECIFIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY
The principles and rules of evidence suggest that limitation
of expert testimony to general information about the syndrome
is faulty. Rules of relevance and probative value demonstrate
that admitting any expert testimony on the syndrome dictates
admission of subjective testimony that identifies the defendant
as a victim of battered woman syndrome.
1. Establishing the Relevance of Objective Testimony
Under the Minnesota and Federal Rules of Evidence, all
relevant evidence is admissible at trial, subject to applicable
privileges and exclusions. 0 5 To be relevant, evidence must
have both probative value and materiality.106 Analysis of objec-
tive battered woman syndrome testimony, without defendant-
specific testimony, reveals that objective testimony alone lacks
probative value and materiality.
Evidence has probative value when it tends to make the
existence of a fact at issue more or less probable. 0 7 In a case in
which a defendant uses battered woman syndrome evidence to
establish a self-defense claim, the defendant seeks to establish
that she acted in response to a reasonable fear of imminent
danger. 08 Experts testifying generally about battered woman
syndrome will state that women who suffer from battered wo-
man syndrome have a heightened sense of fear of their bat-
terer, have a greater perception of impending danger than
women without the syndrome, and may reasonably fear immi-
nent bodily harm or death even when their attacker is not in
the middle of a violent attack.'09 From this testimony the de-
fense asks the jury to infer that the defendant had a height-
ened sense of fear, greater perception, and a reasonable fear of
imminent harm when she killed her batterer."10
This sketch of the defense argument illustrates that mere
objective testimony may lack relevance because it lacks proba-
tive value. From general testimony that victims of battered wo-
man syndrome possess certain characteristics, followed by
105. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. I-
108. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing
reasonableness).
109. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
110. I&
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testimony about the defendant by lay witnesses, a jury cannot
in all cases infer that the defendant possessed those same
characteristics.''
The lack of probative value of objective testimony results,
in part, from the nature of expert testimony itself. Traditional
common-law tests of admissibility of expert testimony require
that, for testimony to be admitted, the subject matter of the tes-
timony be beyond the understanding of the average juror.1 2
By admitting expert testimony about battered woman syn-
drome a trial court acknowledges that the syndrome is beyond
the understanding of the average juror.113
Under Hennum, the defense may link the syndrome to the
defendant only through lay witnesses." 4 Lay witnesses, like ju-
rors, do not understand the complex aspects of battered woman
syndrome.115 Presumably the only link lay witnesses can make
between the defendant and the syndrome will be to identify in
the defendant some of the most general and easily observable
symptoms of the syndrome. The defense will not be able to
connect the defendant to the more complex psychological
symptoms of the syndrome.
Because of the Minnesota Supreme Court's limitation on
expert testimony in this context, battered woman syndrome
testimony will lack probative value in many cases.1 6 In some
straightforward, typical self-defense cases the limitation may
not significantly affect the defense, because it will only seek to
prove the reasonableness of the defendant's response to the
111. See inra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (arguing that battered
woman syndrome is beyond the understanding of the average juror). As Mc-
Cormick states, "[c]ircumstantial evidence ... can be offered to help prove a
material fact, yet be so unrevealing as to be irrelevant to that fact.... To say
that evidence is irrelevant in the sense that it lacks probative value is to say
that knowing the circumstantial evidence does not justify any reasonable in-
ference as to the fact in question." C. McCoRMICK, supra note 43, § 185, at
543-44. Without defendant-specific testimony, under McCormick's analysis, ob-
jective syndrome testimony is irrelevant, because knowing simply that bat-
tered woman syndrome exists does not justify a reasonable inference that the
defendant suffered from the syndrome and therefore acted in self-defense.
112. See supra note 42.
113. In holding that general expert testimony on battered woman syn-
drome is admissible, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the syndrome
was beyond the understanding of the average juror. See supra note 93.
114. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 18-26, 33 (discussing the complex and often counter-
intuitive aspects of battered woman syndrome).
116. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding
that an expert witness must testify that defendant suffers from the syndrome
to establish the relevancy of the general syndrome evidence).
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present attack.117 Lay witness testimony in such cases should
prove sufficient because the defense need only establish that
there was a pattern of violence and that the defendant was be-
ing beaten at the time of her response.n 8 In more complex
"sleeping man" cases, however, the defense must rely on more
complex psychological symptoms of the syndrome such as
hypervigilence and symptoms similar to post-traumatic stress
disorder.- 9 No lay witness will be equipped to identify these
symptoms in the defendant. Thus the more complex psycholog-
ical aspects of the expert's objective testimony necessary to
show the defendant's reasonableness in "sleeping man" cases
will lack probative value.12° Use of battered woman syndrome
expert testimony, for purposes of establishing a defense in a
"sleeping man" case, can be made relevant only through the de-
fendant-specific testimony of an expert.12 1
The materiality element of the relevance definition re-
quires that the evidence help prove a proposition that is at issue
in the case.-2 2 Expert testimony about battered woman syn-
drome in general is immaterial without testimony bearing on
whether the defendant suffers from the syndrome. The propo-
sition at issue in a battered woman syndrome case is whether
the defendant reasonably feared imminent bodily harm or
death from her attacker.m A complete argument using bat-
tered woman syndrome testimony would be as follows: bat-
tered woman syndrome exists, victims of the syndrome have
certain psychological characteristics and perceptive abilities
that cause them to reasonably fear imminent danger even when
they are not being directly attacked, the defendant is a victim
of the syndrome, thus the defendant reasonably feared immi-
nent danger when she killed her batterer.3-4 If the court does
not allow the defendant to establish initially that she is a victim
of the syndrome, there is no link between the evidence and the
defendant, and the evidence proves no part of the defendant's
117. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 34.
119. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussing "sleeping
man" cases and the complex psychological symptoms involved).
120. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (stating that to be pro-
bative, testimony on battered woman syndrome must be linked to the
defendant).
121. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing cases requir-
ing defendant-specific expert testimony).
122. See supra note 43.
123. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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Several courts have noted the necessity for this link be-
tween syndrome evidence and the defendant. For example,
some courts have rejected the evidence simply because the de-
fendant did not establish that she suffered from the syn-
drome. 2 6 The Hennum court seems to have recognized the
materiality problem of limiting expert testimony to a general
description of the syndrome. The court gave the defense the
opportunity to link the expert testimony to the defendant
through non-expert witnesses.127 By allowing general battered
woman syndrome expert testimony, followed by non-expert or
non-psychological testimony bearing on whether the defendant
suffered from battered woman syndrome, the Minnesota
Supreme Court essentially constructed a two-step materiality
burden for the defense. The expert may testify that battered
woman syndrome victims exhibit X, Y, and Z characteristics,2 8
and that battered woman syndrome affects the battered wo-
man's behavior and perceptions in certain ways that bear on
self-defense.129 Other non-expert witnesses then may testify
that the defendant has characteristics X, Y, and Z, thus al-
lowing the jury to conclude that the defendant suffers from the
syndrome and that the expert's general description of the syn-
drome applies to the defendant. 130
The most troublesome effect of this two-part materiality
construct is that it prohibits any testimony derived from a psy-
chological examination.131 This strictly limits the scope of the
expert testimony to the effects of battered woman syndrome
that manifest themselves in objective, observable characteristics
that a layperson can identify, or that an expert can identify
without examining the defendant.132
125. See supra note 43.
126. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text (discussing psychological
characteristics of battered women syndrome) and supra notes 94-96 and ac-
companying text (discussing Hennum's limit to objective testimony only).
129. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 95-96 (discussing the supreme court's holding that the
defense may present witnesses to testify that the defendant possesses charac-
teristics similar to victims of battered woman syndrome).
131. The purpose of the court's holding was specifically to avoid expert tes-
timony based on a psychological examination by the defendant's expert, which
might give rise to the need for an adverse examination. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d
at 799; see also supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
132. The Minnesota Supreme Court essentially held that an expert could
not testify to anything that would require a psychological examination of the
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This limitation may significantly decrease the effect of bat-
tered woman syndrome testimony in "sleeping man" and other
atypical self-defense cases in which defendants rely on the com-
plex psychological effects of battered woman syndrome to es-
tablish reasonableness. 133 Under Hennum, an expert may
testify that in general, battered women have a heightened fear
of their batterers and increased perception of attacks.134 The
defendant also may establish that the victim beat her.13 Hen-
num does not, however, allow crucial testimony by an expert
about how advanced the defendant's syndrome was at the time
of the killing. Hennum thus decreases the opportunity for a
defendant to establish that she had such an advanced case of
battered woman syndrome that she acted in self-defense when
she killed her batterer even though he was not attacking her at
the time of the killing.L3
The Minnesota Supreme Court's two-part method of intro-
ducing battered woman syndrome testimony significantly di-
miniishes the defense's ability to establish the relevancy of the
battered woman syndrome evidence. Relevance requires both
materiality and probative value; 3 7 even if the defendant could
use the Hennum two-part testimony to establish materiality,
the test would likely still lack probative value'3  and be likely
defendant. As noted earlier, battered woman syndrome testimony will be im-
material unless linked to the defendant. See supra notes 122-25. The only way
to establish that link, under Hennum, is for the defense expert to testify that
the typical victim of battered woman syndrome exhibits certain overt charac-
teristics, and for lay witnesses to then testify that the defendant exhibited
those characteristics. See supra notes 97-98, 128-30 and accompanying text.
Thus, the only useful characteristics (those a lay person can identify as present
in the defendant) are non-psychological, objective characteristics visible to an
untrained acquaintance of the defendant. If the expert testifies as to the com-
plex personality assessments of victims of battered woman syndrome, symp-
toms similar to post-traumatic stress disorder, or any other mental
characteristic of victims of battered woman syndrome, few lay witnesses will
be equipped to testify that the defendant has those personality traits. Thus,
such psychological testimony is unlikely to be introduced at all for lack of
materiality.
133. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussing "sleeping
man" and atypical self-defense cases). The defense cannot present the more
complex aspects of battered woman syndrome that contribute to atypical self-
defense cases, because the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly prohibited de-
fendant-specific expert testimony.
134. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (explaining important
role of battered woman syndrome testimony in "sleeping man" cases).
137. See supra note 43.
138. See supra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
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to fail the relevance test altogether.
2. Rule 403 Objections to Objective Testimony
Rule 403 of the Minnesota and Federal Rules of Evidence
prohibits admission of any evidence if its probative value is out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the
jury. 139 By excluding all defendant-specific expert testimony
on battered woman syndrome, the Minnesota Supreme Court
significantly increased the possibility that all battered woman
syndrome testimony will be excluded under Rule 403.
Because not all battered women suffer from battered wo-
man syndrome,140 and because objective battered woman syn-
drome testimony alone has little probative value,141 the risk of
unfair prejudice is high under Hennum. Those women who
suffer from the syndrome will not necessarily suffer the symp-
toms to the same extent.'4 Because different battered women
have different reactions to violence,143 and because battering
relationships move through several cycles of violence, 1 merely
allowing a non-expert to identify a woman as a battered wo-
man, or as suffering from battered woman syndrome, may not
completely explain her psychological state or how she would
respond to violence. One woman may suffer from severe bat-
tered woman syndrome,145 while another woman may be only
in the developing stages of the syndrome, even though both are
battered. 46 Such uncertainty about the extent to which the de-
fendant matches the expert's general testimony regarding bat-
tered woman syndrome is likely to mislead the jury or to cause
unfair prejudice, so that the judge may be forced to exclude the
139. FED. R. EvID. 403; see also supra note 43.
140. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 17-19.
143. See supra notes 16-19.
144. See supra note 17.
145. Id The level of a woman's anxiety also may depend on which stage of
the Walker cycle theory the defendant and her batterer are in at the time of
the killing. I-
146. "[A] woman in stages one and two of the syndrome still generally has
the capability of reaching out for help." People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 655,
481 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (1984). A woman in stage one or two might be aware of
options other than killing her abuser, while the battered woman in stage three
of the syndrome legitimately may feel that killing is the only reasonable op-
tion available. Thus, one woman may have acted rationally in self-defense be-
cause she suffered from advanced battered woman syndrome, while another
woman, in stage one or two, may have less basis for claiming self-defense.
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testimony.147
Under the Hennum rule, trial courts may admit testimony
from non-experts that the defendant was battered or that she
exhibited some of the characteristics that experts identify as
typical of a victim of battered woman syndrome.14 Such non-
expert testimony will raise the question whether the defendant
was a battered woman not yet suffering from the syndrome, a
battered woman in the beginning stages of the syndrome, or a
battered woman suffering from a severe case of the syndrome.
For example, a witness may testify that the defendant's hus-
band beat her, and although that testimony may be relevant in
establishing that, in general, the defendant feared her husband,
the testimony would not establish that the defendant suffered
the more dramatic effects of battering that would be evident in
a victim of severe battered woman syndrome.149 Similarly, if
defense witnesses testified that the defendant felt she could not
leave her husband or that the defendant possessed other char-
acteristics common to victims of the syndrome, that testimony
would not help establish that the defendant suffered from the
syndrome, nor would it show the extent to which the woman
suffered from the syndrome.150
147. See supra note 43 (discussing the limitations on admissibility under
Rule 403).
148. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 799; see also supra notes 94-96 and accompa-
nying text.
149. In some cases, battered women simply claim that, because they were
battered, they perceived imminent danger more quickly and that they exper-
ienced heightened fear of their batterers. See supra notes 33-35 and accompa-
nying text. In other cases, however, especially cases in which the defendant
kills her batterer as he sleeps or before an attack begins, the defendant seeks
to prove more. The defendant asserts that because she suffered from the ad-
vanced battered woman syndrome, she experienced not only heightened fear
and perception of her batterer's actions, but also an imminent fear of death or
great bodily harm even when her batterer was sleeping, or before a battering
incident began. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
150. Merely assessing the defendant's symptoms, even in a psychological
context, may lead to misinterpretation and confusion. Rosewater, supra note
37, at 90. For example, battered woman syndrome symptoms can be indistin-
guishable from schizophrenia symptoms. Id. Logically, then, diagnosing the
defendant based only on non-psychological symptoms or behavior, which is
necessary under the Hennum decision, heightens the possibility for even more
misinterpretation of the defendant's symptoms. If a psychologist, after an ex-
amination of psychological symptoms, can mistake battered woman syndrome
for schizophrenia, it seems likely that witnesses or jurors who see only non-
psychological symptoms might mistake certain behavior for battered woman
syndrome, or explain behavior away as something other than battered woman
syndrome. In short, the Hennum limitation precludes a conclusive diagnosis
of the defendant as a victim of battered woman syndrome.
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Both of these unanswered questions - whether the de-
fendant suffers from the syndrome, and to what extent the de-
fendant suffers from the syndrome - are crucial in
determining the degree to which battered woman syndrome
might have contributed to the defendant's fear of imminent
danger. Without defendant-specific expert testimony, the jury
may accept the expert's testimony about battered woman syn-
drome as true of the defendant to the same extent that it was
true of the battered women that the expert described.151 These
questions also require expert testimony for fully informed an-
swers, as the jury is ill-equipped to diagnose the extent to
which a defendant suffers from battered woman syndrome.' 52
Such testimony also may violate Rule 403, because its pro-
bative value would be low, 153 but the danger of unfair prejudice
and misleading the jury would be high.
III. DEFENDANT-SPECIFIC TESTIMONY
NECESSITATES ADVERSE MENTAL
EXAMINATION
The argument for expert defendant-specific testimony
raises the issue that the Minnesota Supreme Court sought to
avoid in Hennum: whether, when the defense seeks to prove
self-defense through expert testimony on battered woman syn-
drome based on a psychological examination of the defendant, a
trial court has authority to order an adverse mental examina-
tion of the defendant. In light of the rationale behind the rules
of criminal procedure covering adverse examinations, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court should expand Minnesota Rule of Crimi-
151. As noted earlier, without defendant-specific testimony, objective bat-
tered woman syndrome testimony has little probative value. See supra notes
107-21 and accompanying text. Thus, the jury may assume that, because an ex-
pert testifies that the battered women he interviewed, who suffered from the
syndrome, behaved in a certain way, that the defendant also behaved in that
way when she killed her batterer. When an expert testifies as to the general
effects of the syndrome on battered women and the defense then links the de-
fendant to that testimony through nonpsychological characteristics, the jury,
no matter the extent to which the defendant suffers from the syndrome, may
automatically apply all of the expert's testimony to the defendant.
In State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981), the
Supreme Court of Ohio mentioned this problem as one reason for excluding
battered woman syndrome testimony. The court noted that the expert had not
personally interviewed the defendant. Hi at 520, 423 N.E.2d at 139. The court
found the testimony inadmissible because it "would tend to stereotype defend-
ant, causing the jury to become prejudiced." I- at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
152. See supra notes 42, 93, 140-50 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
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nal Procedure 20.02 to cover all cases in which the defendant's
expert presents psychological testimony about the defendant's
mental condition, based on an examination of the defendant.
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the court of ap-
peals in Hennum that Rule 20.02 does not allow an adverse ex-
amination in the self-defense context, and that trial courts do
not have inherent authority to order such an examination. 154
Rule 20.02 gives a trial court authority to order an adverse
mental examination only when the defendant notifies the state
that she will claim a defense of mental illness or deficiency- 55
A close reading of the language of the rule suggests that it is
not enough for the defendant merely to claim some mental ill-
ness or deficiency; she must claim a defense of mental illness or
deficiency.'-
The Minnesota adverse examination rule is unnecessarily
narrow because it covers only two defenses that may involve
psychological testimony. 5 7 The rule distinguishes mental ill-
ness or deficiency cases from other defenses that require expert
psychological testimony merely because in such cases the
mental condition about which the expert testifies is the de-
fense, not just evidence supporting a defense.'16 That reasoning
is faulty. It is the nature of the testimony, not the nature of
the defense, that should trigger the rule. The rationale for an
adverse examination is that, if expert testimony based on a psy-
chological examination is necessary to the defendant's case, the
only appropriate and sufficient form of rebuttal evidence for
the prosecution is adverse expert testimony. 59 Courts do not
order an adverse examination because it rebuts only a particu-
lar defense, but because the nature of the expert testimony is
such that the only sufficient form of rebuttal is testimony by an
154. State v. Hennum, 441 .W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. 1989) (citing State v.
Hennum, 428 N.W.2d 859, 868-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)).
155. MNN. &. CRm. P. 20.02. 'The court having trial jurisdiction over the
offense charged may order a mental examination of the defendant when the
defense has notified the prosecuting attorney... of an intention to assert a
defense of mental illness or deficiency.. . ." Ii, Subd. 1; see also supra note
64 and accompanying text.
156. The rule expressly excludes mental state testimony that does not it-
self constitute a defense. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing
the Minnesota rule). Even if a defendant presents evidence of mental illness
in a self-defense claim, the rule will not apply because she did not claim
mental illness as a defense.
157. See supra note 64.
158. 1I
159. See supra notes 63, 69. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed. See
Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 800.
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expert who also has had the opportunity to examine the de-
fendant.16° The federal rule governing adverse examinations
recognizes this principle, and authorizes an adverse examina-
tion whenever a defendant offers testimony about a mental
condition bearing on the defendant's guilt.161
Under this rationale, defendants who offer expert battered
woman syndrome testimony based on a psychological examina-
tion appropriately may be ordered to submit to an adverse ex-
amination. Not only is battered woman syndrome testimony
often based on a psychological examination; psychologists diag-
nose the syndrome using complex diagnostic tools' 62 and have
found the psychological symptoms of the syndrome closely re-
semble symptoms related to other mental conditions. 163 The
psychological nature of the testimony necessitates an adverse
examination.
The solution to the Hennum conundrum - when the de-
fense relies on expert psychological testimony derived from
mental examination, but the state's statutes and common law
prohibit an adverse examination - is not to avoid the rule, but
to change the rule to create a more rational procedure for pres-
entation of battered woman syndrome testimony.
Under Minnesota law, the Minnesota Supreme Court, with
the assistance of an advisory committee, has the power to pro-
mulgate rules of criminal procedure.164  The Minnesota
Supreme Court and its advisory committee should exercise
their rulemaking power to broaden Rule 20.02 as follows: 165
PROPOSED REVISED MINN. R. CRim. P. 20.02
Rule 20.02, Subd. 1. Authority of Court to Order Examination. The
160. See supra notes 63, 69.
161. See supra note 64.
162. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 20-26, 73.
164. MHNN. STAT. § 480.059, Subd. 1 (1988). This section grants the supreme
court broad power to regulate the pleadings, practice, procedure, and forms in
criminal actions by promulgating rules from time to time. Id. The court, to
promulgate such rules, must appoint an advisory committee of lawyers and
judges to assist the court in considering and preparing the rules. MINN. STAT.
§ 480.059, Subd. 2 (1988). The court also must distribute copies of any proposed
rules to Minnesota attorneys and judges for their consideration and sugges-
tions. MINN. STAT. § 480.059, Subd. 4 (1988). Finally, after considering and vot-
ing to adopt a rule, the court must publish the rule as an appendix to the
official reports of the court. MINN. STAT. § 480.059, Subd. 6 (1988). The rule
may not be officially adopted until 120 days after publication, to allow attor-
neys and judges time to comment. Id.
165. See supra note 64 (quoting present Rule 20.02).
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court having trial jurisdiction over the offense charged may order a
mental examination of the defendant when the defense has notified
the court and the prosecuting attorney of an intention to introduce
expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other
mental condition of the defendant bearing upon the issue of guilt,
when the defendant in a misdemeanor case pleads not guilty by rea-
son of mental illness or mental deficiency, or when at the trial of the
case, the defendant offers evidence of such mental condition.
The "mental disease or defect or any other mental condi-
tion" language in this proposed rule is broader than the current
"mental illness or deficiency" language of present Rule 20.02,
and more closely parallels the federal rule.'6 The proposed
rule would therefore encompass battered woman syndrome tes-
timony as a "mental condition", allowing the defendant to
make full use of her expert testimony on battered woman syn-
drome, but also giving the prosecution ample opportunity for
rebuttal.
At the same time, however, the proposed rule uses the fed-
eral requirement that the mental condition be related to the
defendant's guilt. This requirement prevents the prosecution
from demanding an adverse examination in response to all evi-
dence of the defendant's mental condition, and limits adverse
examinations to cases in which the defendant claims that a
mental condition bears on her guilt.
This revised rule would set limits on adverse examinations
and their use in court, thus protecting defendants.16 7 The pro-
posed rule, which is similar to the federal rule, ensures that de-
fendants in JoAnn Hennum's position - who introduce expert
testimony regarding a mental condition, but do not claim a de-
fense of mental illness or deficiency - would receive the same
166. FED. R. CraM. P. 12.2(b) and (c) state, in pertinent part:
(b) Expert Testimony of Defendant's Mental Condition. If a defend-
ant intends to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease
or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing upon
the issue of guilt, the defendant shall... notify the attorney for the
government in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice
with the clerk....
(c) Mental Examination of Defendant. In an appropriate case the
court may... order the defendant to submit to an examination pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C. 4241 or 4242.
The proposed rule follows the structure of the Minnesota rule, but adopts the
broader language of the federal rule, which authorizes adverse examinations
whenever the defendant presents evidence of a "mental disease or defect or
any other mental condition of the defendant bearing on the issue of guilt."
167. See supra notes 64, 88 and accompanying text (describing Rule 20.02
procedural safeguards and the lack of safeguards in the Hennum
examination).
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protection as defendants who presently undergo an adverse ex-
amination under rules such as Rule 2 0 .02.168
This proposal is not without disadvantages. As some de-
fense attorneys have already found, an adverse examination
makes acquittal more difficult.169 An argument also may be
made that battered women have overcome great obstacles to
have expert testimony admitted, and should not be subject to
yet another limitation in their effort to explain the reasonable-
ness of their behavior. Certainly both concerns are legitimate.
Neither, however, outweighs the fact that when the defense ex-
pert examines the defendant to present psychological testi-
mony, the only way the prosecution can adequately rebut the
evidence is through the results of another expert's examina-
tion. 7 0 In addition, battered woman syndrome is likely to gain
168. See supra note 88 (discussing the lack of procedural safeguards in
JoAnn Hennum's adverse examination).
Although the argument may be made that a broader adverse examination
rule will result in a contest of experts, that argument lacks substance. It does
not logically follow that, if both sides present expert testimony, their com-
bined testimony will only be confusing or useless. McCord, Syndromes,
Profiles and Other Mental Exotica, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 89 (1987). McCord notes
that one expert's opinion may be clearly superior, and the experts' testimony
may not be completely contradictory. Id. Furthermore, as the Fourth Circuit
noted in United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968), because ad-
verse examinations are conducted by court-appointed experts, there is always
the possibility that the court-appointed expert will conclude that the defend-
ant suffers from the condition she claims affected her behavior. Id. at 725.
Another factor working against a battle of the experts in the battered wo-
man syndrome context is the prosecutor's codified ethical duty to pursue jus-
tice, not to convict the defendant. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBIL1TY EC 7-13 (1989). Given this ethical duty, the prosecutor, as a
seeker of justice, has an obligation to find as objective an expert as possible.
This ethical duty and the nature of examinations by court-appointed experts
significantly diminishes concerns about excessive expert testimony.
Interestingly, in 1988 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded,
that adverse examinations in the battered woman syndrome context were ap-
propriate and constitutional. State v. Briand, 130 N.H. 650, 657, 547 A.2d 235,
240 (1988) (per curiam); see also supra note 74 and accompanying text. The
New Hampshire court noted that although no rule existed to authorize exami-
nations in this context, such rules would be appropriate and helpful in future
cases. Briand, 130 N.H. at 658, 547 A.2d at 241. This Comment suggests such a
rule also would be helpful for future Minnesota cases.
169. Schneider, supra note 34, states that adverse mental examinations are
"becoming a serious problem in many cases involving battered women." Id. at
68, n.59. Citing a recent New Jersey case in which the prosecution put on an
expert witness who testified that the defendant did not have battered woman
syndrome, Schneider concludes that the defense attorney "believes that the
prosecution's rebuttal use of expert testimony created serious obstacles to ac-
quittal." Id. (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984)).
170. See supra notes 63, 69 and accompanying text.
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legitimacy if defendants agree to undergo an examination by
another expert. If the syndrome is to be accepted as a legiti-
mate psychological phenomenon that establishes that battered
women act in self-defense, it must be rigorously challenged in
the courts.
CONCLUSION
Now that many courts, including the Minnesota Supreme
Court, have chosen to admit expert testimony about battered
woman syndrome to support claims of self-defense, those same
courts must decide the role such testimony will play in a crimi-
nal trial. In State v. Hennum, the Minnesota Supreme Court
limited expert testimony on battered woman syndrome to gen-
eral commentary on the syndrome itself, refusing to allow ex-
pert testimony linking the syndrome to the defendant. The
court limited the testimony in this way to avoid a possible ad-
verse examination of the defendant. By excluding defendant-
specific expert testimony, however, the Minnesota Supreme
Court significantly reduced the effectiveness of expert testi-
mony about battered woman syndrome.
A better solution to the problem raised by Hennum is to
admit defendant-specific testimony about battered woman syn-
drome. To accommodate the rebuttal needs of the prosecution,
then, the Minnesota Supreme Court should expand Rule 20.02
to cover battered woman syndrome cases. This solution, unlike
the supreme court's solution in Hennum, would give the jury
the benefit of complete expert testimony, while still giving the
prosecution the opportunity to rebut the defense expert's testi-
mony through an examination of the defendant by a court-ap-
pointed expert.
Sarah Crippen Madison
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